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1. Introduction
The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
have long been criticized for allegedly worsening wellbeing in the countries where they are
imposed.3 It is claimed that they may reduce welfare, exacerbate income inequalities, and
ultimately provoke social unrest as those in society hit by the SAPs lash out in response.
Stiglitz (2002) provides an account of the possible effects of SAPs when he writes: “For
decades, people in the developing world have rioted when the austerity programs imposed
on their countries [by the IMF] proved to be too harsh...” (p.3). “For the peasants in
developing countries who toil to pay off their countries’ IMF debts or the businessmen who
suffer from higher value added taxes upon the insistence of the IMF, the current system
run by the IMF is one of taxation without representation ... Left with no alternatives,
no way to express their concern, to press for change, people riot” (p.20). Yet despite
widespread acknowledgement that there is a link between the imposition of SAPs and the
occurrence of social unrest, we still do not have a clear understanding of the forces that
drive this link.
The purpose of this paper is to try to understand the relationship between the im-
position of SAPs and the occurrence of social unrest. We identify a well-defined set of
circumstances under which the imposition of an SAP can be expected to lead to social
unrest and find support for this in the data. Our testable prediction is that if a country
has an SAP, it will also tend to experience social unrest if it has a comparative advantage
in primary products and at the same time undergoes deeper (i.e. greater/increased) trade
integration.
This prediction builds on an analytical framework developed and tested empirically
in our prior work, Stroup and Zissimos (2011, henceforth SZ). Since the present paper
builds on that paper, it is worth reviewing the key features of the framework we set
up in SZ. In that previous paper, we show how the effects of a ruling elite’s attempts
to maintain political stability on efficiency depend on underlying factor endowments.
3SAPs have two components. One is the extension of loans, coupled with possible multilateral renego-
tiation to reduce a country’s total debt obligations. The second is the adjustment of a country’s policies
which is aimed at increasing economic efficiency and growth, and with it a country’s ability to meet its
debt obligations (Boughton 2001). Elsewhere in the literature, the term ‘Structural Adjustment Loan’
(SAL) is used equivalently to our use of the term SAP.
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If a country’s endowments are such that it has a comparative advantage in primary
products, and if the elite predominantly owns the land used to produce primary products,
trade integration is potentially destabilizing. The reason is because the conjunction of
a comparative advantage in primary products and trade liberalization raises the value
of primary products and hence the land on which they are produced. This raises the
incentives for the rest of society to try to seize control of the elite’s land in a popular
uprising. This in turn mandates an increase of government spending in general and
government employment in particular, through which the elite make transfers to the rest
of society in a bid to maintain political stability.4 The general-equilibrium effects of
increasing government employment are to draw resources away from the more efficient
manufacturing sector, potentially reducing overall economic efficiency. If a country’s
endowments are such that it has a comparative advantage in manufactures then the elite’s
incentives are reversed, and trade integration enhances economic efficiency.
The testable prediction that arises from the theoretical model in that earlier paper
is as follows. An increase in trade integration leads to an increase in government employ-
ment in countries with a comparative advantage in primary products, but to a decrease
in government employment in countries with a comparative advantage in manufactures.
Our econometric analysis in that paper, which conditions on a variety of country-specific
factors and persistence in the size of government, provides support for this prediction
across a variety of specifications.
The testable prediction of the present paper is then derived as follows. The condition-
ality of an SAP requires a country to liberalize trade while at the same time undertaking
privatization, involving a process of rolling back the state and reducing government em-
ployment.5 But in the context of the framework set out by SZ, if the country has a
4Increasing the size of government may not be the most efficient way to make transfers aimed at
maintaining political stability, with alternative more far-reaching measures such as land reforms likely
to be more efficient. However, there appears to be anecdotal evidence to suggest that government
employment is a relatively manipulable device through which transfers can be made quickly if the need
arises, in contrast to land reforms which tend to proceed relatively slowly. For example, The Economist
(2011) documents several instances where ruling elites rapidly made transfers to the rest of society
through government employment in their attempts to quell the wave of uprisings in the Middle East
known as the Arab Spring.
5SAPs also typically require stabilization of the macroeconomic environment, principally through the
use of monetary policy. That aspect of SAPs is beyond the scope of the present analysis. See Williamson
(1989) for the original statement of the “Washington Consensus” on policy reform.
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comparative advantage in primary products, the rest of society has an incentive to mount
a revolution precisely in situations where trade liberalization occurs and so inequality
increases. Without the constraints imposed by an SAP, the elite would respond by in-
creasing government employment in order to undertake redistribution and thus defuse
the incentive for political unrest. But the constraints imposed by the SAP to privatize
and roll back the state constrain the elite in their ability to undertake redistribution
through expansion of government employment. This results in the rest of society’s in-
centive to mount a revolution remaining undefused. Therefore, the testable prediction of
the present paper is a surprising implication of SZ that we did not pursue in the earlier
paper. It is that when a country has a comparative advantage in primary products, trade
liberalization in the presence of an SAP makes the country ‘vulnerable to revolution.’
How do we capture vulnerability to revolution in the data? The lead up to a rev-
olution usually unfolds gradually. There is often a protracted period between when the
incentive to mount a revolution arises and when a revolution actually occurs, assuming
the ruling elite do successfully avert its occurrence. Ellis and Fender (2010) have modeled
this process as an information cascade whereby members of the rest of society signal to
one another their desire to mount a revolution. Adapting Ellis and Fender’s framework to
the present context, the types of social unrest that have arisen in response to SAPs may
be construed in terms of such signals: for example strike activity, violent demonstrations,
large scale peaceful protest. We will refer to these forms of social unrest as indicating
vulnerability to revolution.6
The specific process through which a ruling elite may defuse vulnerability to revo-
lution is as follows. Once a situation arises where a country may become vulnerable to
revolution, there is a window of opportunity within which the elite can respond with mea-
sures, such as increasing government employment, that restore the status quo. The elite
accept the constraints on government employment imposed by an SAP, through which
vulnerability to revolution may arise, because it is usually the elite who have most to
gain from the SAP’s successful imposition. The reason is because the SAP generally de-
6The interpretation that social unrest indicates vulnerability to revolution may seem extreme given
that we have developed countries in our dataset where revolution is rarely observed. Here we are taking
the position that these countries can in principle be vulnerable to revolution but that a well-functioning
democracy has better mechanisms for defusing this vulnerability including, as a final backstop, transfer
of power through the ballot box.
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termines a country’s future access to world capital and goods markets, which the elite
make use of. To the extent that the rest of society is unable to access capital markets and
unable to afford traded goods, its benefit from the imposition of an SAP is less clear. So a
country’s elite is likely to support the imposition of an SAP to the fullest extent possible
while the rest of society may be against it. But the elite will have an incentive to relax
its terms if the SAP appears to be creating vulnerability to revolution. Governments
generally have sufficient leeway, and in any case the sovereignty, to renege on the terms
of an SAP if needed (Easterly 2005).
We are able to obtain measures of various types of social unrest across a broad range
of countries from the Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS). And we proxy
trade liberalization using a standard measure of economic openness. Our results show
that, for a country that has a comparative advantage in primary products and an SAP in
place, an increase in economic openness relative to the size of government does increase
vulnerability to revolution and hence the likelihood of social conflict. This relationship
holds for six out of eight measures of social conflict in the CNTS. We take this to represent
support in the data for our framework’s prediction. As we will discuss below, this observed
relationship is robust to a broad range of salient alternative hypotheses.
The key difference between the present paper and SZ can be understood in terms
of differences in the time-frame of the analysis. An underlying assumption in SZ is that
sufficient time passes within a period that the elite are able to resolve any vulnerability
to revolution using adjustments to government employment. In that paper, social unrest
is not actually observed on the equilibrium path. In the present paper, the time-frame
within a period is assumed to be sufficiently short that vulnerability to revolution may
indeed arise, reflected in social unrest. This difference in approach makes it possible for
us to study the causes of social unrest in the present paper, where this was not possible
in SZ.
The past literature in economics evaluating the impact of IMF SAPs has tended to
focus overwhelmingly on their impact on economic growth, not least because the stated
intention of SAPs is to improve it. The results from a wide range of studies, by the
IMF and by independent researchers, have found positive, zero and negative effects of
IMF lending on growth. Easterly (2005) first reviews the literature and reports it to be
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inconclusive, and then undertakes his own analysis to show a significantly negative effect
of SAPs on economic growth. There is similarly mixed evidence of SAPs on policies (see
the survey by Killick, Gunatilaka and Marr 1998). There is a small academic literature
on the effects of SAPs on conflict, which is nicely summarized by Guimond (2007). This
literature studies the efficacy of SAPs in countries that have had social conflict in the
past, focusing on civil war, at reducing the likelihood that conflict will break out again
in the future. As with the literature on the impact of SAPs on growth, conclusions are
varied with no clear pattern emerging.7
There is also a literature in political science and sociology on how structural adjust-
ment or the policies attributed to IMF conditionality affect social unrest. Walton and
Seddon (1994) were among the first to systematically explore the significant fluctuations
in commodity prices that ultimately gave way to the first Latin American debt crisis of
the 1980s, prompting intervention by the IMF in a bid to restore economic and political
stability. They document that it was the wave of unrest that came about as a result of
these events that prompted the term ‘IMF Riot’. Similarly to the literature in economics
on the relationship between IMF conditionality and growth, the line of enquiry exploring
IMF conditionality and conflict has largely been inconclusive; see Hartzell, Hoddie and
Bauer (2010), who find that IMF structural adjustment programs increase the likelihood
of civil war, and the literature cited therein. Hartzell et al is related to our paper in that
the discussion emphasizes how IMF conditionality creates gainers and losers while at the
same time constraining the government’s ability to make transfers that could mitigate
social unrest. But neither they nor the literature that they cite focus on comparative
advantage as a way to distinguish between the circumstances under which the rest of
society is likely to resort to social unrest as we do here. The key novel point we are
making, therefore, is that comparative advantage plays a decisive role in predicting the
circumstances under which IMF conditionality leads to social unrest.
7Structural adjustment loans from the World Bank also have conditionalities attached to them and
there is a literature evaluating these as well. We focus on IMF SAPs because they are associated more
closely with the occurrence of social conflict. This is perhaps because IMF SAPs are tied more tightly to
balance of payments crises which are likely to require immediate constraints on entitlement spending that
in turn increase inequality and provoke social unrest. World Bank lending has been more associated with
long term structural adjustment, although since the 1980s IMF and World Bank lending have been used
in conjunction with one another, the former maintaining its focus on adjustments to recover from balance
of payments crises, the latter on longer term objectives of policy reform (Boughton 2001, Easterly 2005).
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details of the
empirical set-up. Section 3 describes the data in more detail. Section 4 presents the
estimation results and Section 5 discusses the extent to which the estimates might be
given a causal interpretation. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Empirical Set-up
We now set out an econometric formalization of the economic framework described infor-
mally in the previous section. In SZ, an elite maintains the status quo by ensuring that
a ‘no-revolution constraint’ (NRC) binds. From a situation where the NRC is binding, it
would fail to bind if the country had a comparative advantage in primary products and
trade integration deepened. The elite would then make the NRC bind again by increasing
government employment. In any country i and period t, the NRC depends directly on
the elite’s choice variable, which is the size of government employment, Bit, as well as on
trade integration, Oit, and comparative advantage, Ci.
8 We can express the reduced form
of the NRC as ψ(Ci, Oit, Bit).
We will say that the country in question becomes vulnerable to revolution when its
NRC fails to bind. The NRC fails to bind if 0 < ψ(Ci, Oit, Bit). In this state, members
of the rest of society signal to one another that they would like to engage in a revolution
by undertaking various types of social unrest. To formalize this, denote the probability of
social unrest in country i and period t by cit. Given that idiosyncratic income shocks, εit,
influence the probability of social unrest, we can express the probability of social unrest
as follows:
cit =
{
0 if 0 ≥ ψ(Ci, Oit, Bit) + εit
1 if 0 < ψ(Ci, Oit, Bit) + εit
(2.1)
Consider a country that has a comparative advantage in primary products (Ci = 1).
For Ci = 1, increased trade integration increases vulnerability to revolution; ∂ψ/∂Oit >
0. At the same time, an expansion of government employment has an offsetting effect;
∂ψ/∂Bit < 0. The opposite effects hold for countries with a comparative advantage
in manufactures, where the term ‘manufactures’ will be used as a short-hand for ‘all
8For the purposes of our econometric implementation, trade integration is treated as exogenous. See
the next section for details.
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goods other than primary products’. An unconstrained elite will usually be able to offset
changes in trade integration with changes in government employment, thus heading off
social unrest.9 This specification captures in a simple way the econometric framework
of SZ but it does not allow for the increased likelihood of social unrest if the country is
bound by an SAP that is the concern of the present paper.
Where an SAP is imposed, an elite may be constrained from increasing government
employment, at least in the first instance, thus creating vulnerability to revolution and
increasing the probability of social unrest. Vulnerability comprises three necessary condi-
tions for the NRC to fail. First, a country must have a comparative advantage in primary
products (Ci = 1). Second, the country must have an SAP, brought about by the occur-
rence of a balance of payments (BOP) crisis (BOPit = 1). Finally we require an inverse
relationship between trade integration and the size of government employment, which is
given by the fact that the country has a comparative advantage in primary products. This
is formalized by the function f(Oit, Bit), whereby ∂
2fit/∂Oit∂Bit < 0. We thus measure
vulnerability to revolution as follows:
vit =
{
0 if BOPit = 0;
f(Oit, Bit) if Ci = 1 & BOPit = 1.
(2.2)
This setup suggests a straightforward estimating approach via the following equation:
cjit = β
j
1vit + Θit + ai + τ t + εit, (2.3)
where the variables are defined as follows: cjit is a specific measure of social unrest such as
strike activity or the occurrence of violent demonstrations; vit indexes the vulnerability
to revolution in terms of the probability that the NRC may fail to bind; Θit is a vector
of time-varying country-specific controls; ai is a vector of country-specific fixed effects; τ t
are year effects.10
9In fact there exist extreme conditions under which the elite will not be able to use government
employment to maintain the status quo. We abstract from them here but discuss them at length in SZ.
10Although a large literature takes the incidence of BOP crises and SAPs as given, there is a growing
literature that attempts to instrument SAPs conditional on BOP incidence. While this approach may
be useful for studying, for example, the relationship between SAPs and growth, it would not, in our
context, fully address the identification concern since the usual instruments (e.g. political proximity to
major shareholders at the IMF, voting behavior at the United Nations) will also be correlated with any
potentially time-varying country-specific institution. For further discussion, see, for example, Bird and
Rowlands (1991, 2002), World Bank (1992, 1998), Conway (1994), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Burnside
and Dollar (2000), Barro and Lee (2005), Dreher and Jensen (2007), and Kilby (2009).
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It might be suggested that we implement (2.3) using a binary response model such
as logit or probit by imposing the assumption of normally distributed errors. However,
fixed effects in such frameworks must be computed individually, leading to the inciden-
tal variables problem in which the number of parameters increases in proportion to the
number of countries, thus generating inconsistent parameter estimates. Thus, we take the
simplest possible approach and estimate (2.3) using a linear-probability model estimated
via OLS, which allows for feasible computation of individual country fixed effects. Our
focus is not on the precise marginal effects of vulnerability to social unrest but rather
the presence or absence of the predicted effect. Therefore, we view the robustness con-
ferred by using country-specific fixed effects as strongly outweighing the requirement that
estimated marginal effects be interpreted as a linear approximation of the true effects.
3. Data
To construct the dataset for this study, we combined the dataset from SZ with the Cross
National Time Series (CNTS) dataset to provide measures of economic activity in con-
junction with indicators of domestic social unrest. The measures of domestic social unrest
in CNTS are as follows (followed by an abbreviation in parentheses):11 (1) politically
motivated assassinations (assassinations); (2) a strike of one thousand or more industrial
workers (strikes); (3) armed activity by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces
aimed at the overthrow of the present regime (armed activity); (4) a rapidly develop-
ing situation that threatens the downfall of the present regime (threatened regimes); (5)
systematic elimination of opposition politicians by jailing or execution (opposition elim-
ination); (6) violent demonstration or clash of more than one hundred citizens involving
the use of physical force (violent demonstrations); (7) any actual or attempted illegal or
forced change in the top government elite including armed rebelion (revolution - pos. at-
tempted); (8) any peaceful public gathering of at least one hundred people for the purpose
of voicing opposition to government policies or authority (peaceful demonstrations). For
each of the eight measures, indexed by j = 1...8, we construct a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if, for a particular country in a particular year, there is an occurrence
of social unrest.
11See the footnote of Table 3 for more extensive descriptions of each of the measures of social conflict.
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We measure government employment, Bit, using the log of annual data for central
government spending on wages and salaries (1972-2008 in millions of real US dollars) from
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Government Finance Statistics database. A
full list of countries is given in Table 1.12
We employ the measure of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) due to Balassa
(1965), and construct it from World Bank trade flows.13 Measurement of trade integration
presents us with a difficulty when it comes to estimation. On the one hand, our discus-
sion of IMF/SAP conditionality in the Introduction suggests that tariffs would be the
appropriate way to measure this. After all, the Washington Consensus calls for trade lib-
eralization through adjustments to economic policy. However tariffs are also understood
to be endogenously determined, making them unsuitable for use on the right hand side of
a regression. Consequently, we measure trade integration with the gravity-based measure
used by Rose (2004), and Hijzena, Gorg and Munchin (2008) among others, which is the
distance-weighted average of all trading partners’ GDPs.14 First define Yit as country i’s
GDP in year t expressed in millions of constant dollars and let δij be the distance between
countries i and j. This measure of trade integration is Oit =
∑
j 6=i Yjt/δij. Unlike other
measures of trade integration such as tariffs and the terms of trade, which are clearly
12Since our estimation procedure identifies parameters using only within-variation, we need a sample
whose variables exhibit significant variation across time. Fortunately, both trade integration and central
government employment varied significantly during our sample period for many countries. An alternative
would have been to employ data from the International Labor Organization. However, for our purposes,
these data are not nearly as comprehensive in their coverage across countries as the IMF series, especially
prior to 1995.
13Let Xikt be country i’s exports of product category k to the rest of the world in period t, and let Xiωt
be total exports from country i to the rest of the world within a set of product categories ω. Xnkt is the
sum of all other countries’ (i.e. j 6= i) exports in product category k, and Xnωt are total world exports
in the set of product categories. Then RCAikt = (Xikt/Xiωt)/(Xnkt/Xnωt). Following the standard
approach, country i has a revealed comparative advantage in product k if and only if RCAikt > 1. In
our sample, RCA is stable over time, allowing use of the mode across years as our measure of a country’s
comparative advantage. Given that we are making cross-country sector comparisons, we also require a
correspondence between the Balassa index and pre-trade relative prices; the Hillman condition must hold
(see Hillman 1980). In a dataset of 165 countries from 1970-1998, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2008)
have shown that violations of the Hillman condition are rare after 1984 but prior to 1984 violations do
occur relatively frequently for countries whose exports are concentrated on a small number of sectors.
Our main results are slightly stronger when we truncate the data in 1984, which provides support for our
hypothesis and for the empirical relevance of the Hillman condition.
14Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010) argue in their study of India that in the event
of an unanticipated BOP crisis and SAP, the tariff reforms mandated by the program may be regarded
as exogenous. However, this argument would only apply in our dataset to the minority of countries in
any given period that were constrained by SAPs. Therefore, we cannot use the approach advocated by
Goldberg et al.
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endogenous, most countries’ governments have limited if any influence over (the distance-
weighted average of) their trading partners’ GDPs. Therefore, variation in Oit plausibly
extracts identifying variation in relative prices.
The variable vit is measured as follows. First, vit = 0 when either Ci or BOPit are
equal to zero and vit = f(Oit, Bit) otherwise, so that vit = f(Oit, Bit) × Ci × BOPit,
where the latter two are binary variables. Second, since our fixed-effects estimation
procedure identifies model parameters off of variation within a country across time,
we approximate f(Oit, Bit) with Oit/Bit. This satisfies the requirement (specified above)
that ∂2fit/∂Oit∂Bit < 0.
Balance-of-payments crises are likely to induce social unrest in a variety of ways not
directly tied to the theoretical model presented in SZ. To control for these, we also include
BOPit by itself in the regressions. Similarly, we include Ci, Bit and Oit in levels in all
equations, along with all pairwise interactions among these variables. We also include
the full vector of interaction combinations within the set {Oit, Bit, Ci, BOPit}; this will
be referred to in the tables as the ‘interaction vector’. Finally, we control for observable
determinants of total government employment that may be correlated with trade integra-
tion, comparative advantage, and BOP crises. For example, larger economies may tend to
have both a comparative advantage in manufacturing and to experience larger responses
of total government employment to changes in trade integration. If larger economies tend
to be more developed, they may also be less subject to BOP crises. To capture these
economy-size effects, we include total GDP expressed in millions of US dollars (GDPit).
Similarly, countries with higher incomes may tend to have higher wage rates and thus
higher central government spending on wages and salaries. This may vary systematically
by comparative advantage to the extent that countries with a comparative advantage
in manufacturing have higher average wage rates than countries with a comparative ad-
vantage in primary products. An ideal measure would be middle class wage rates or the
minimum wage. Since no such data exist at the annual level for a wide variety of develop-
ing countries, we use GDP per capita in thousands of dollars (GDPit/Nit) instead. These
two series came from the Penn World Tables. Table 2 summarizes the unrest measures
broken down by the incidence of unrest.
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4. Empirical Results
Table 3 presents results from a simple regression of each of our eight measures of social
unrest (introduced at the beginning of Section 3) on BOPit. Recall that BOPit captures
BOP crises that involved imposition of an SAP. The estimated coefficients are positive
and significant at conventional levels across six out of the eight measures, confirming that
SAPs are indeed broadly correlated with the occurrence of social unrest, as generally
suspected.
In Table 4, we introduce the measure of vulnerability to revolution, vit, to the spec-
ification. From the top row we can see that inclusion of the vulnerability measure leads
to substantial attrition in the predictive power of BOPit; in this case it has no predictive
power for assassinations (column 1), threatened regimes (column 4), opposition elimina-
tion (column 5), and revolutions (column 7). This indicates that the observed correlation
presented in Table 3 between BOPit and our eight measures of social unrest is likely
to reflect omitted country-specific variables and, in particular, the omission of vit itself.
Turning to the coefficient on vit, we can see that for all but two measures the estimated
coefficients are negative; in three cases they are negative and significant. In only one case,
that of armed activity (column 3) is the estimated coefficient positive and significant.
As discussed above, the presence of country-specific factors simultaneously correlated
with BOPit and vit could lead to biased estimates of the true effect of these variables on
the incidence of social unrest. To address this possibility, in Table 5 we incorporate
country-specific fixed effects and the interaction vector. Looking across the first row,
which presents the estimated coefficients on vit, we can see that inclusion of these country-
specific factors leads to a dramatic change in the estimated coefficients so that vit is
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels for all but two of our measures
of social unrest. The exceptions are threatened regimes (column 4, which is only significant
at the 10 percent level) and peaceful demonstrations (column 8). This indicates that, given
a BOP crises and imposition of SAP in a country with a comparative advantage in primary
products, a deepening of trade integration relative to the size of government did indeed
increase the likelihood of social unrest. For assassinations (column 1) and revolutions
(pos. attempted) (column 7), the coefficient on BOPit is positive and significant at the
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five and one percent levels respectively. This suggests that, for these measures of social
unrest, a BOP crises and SAP significantly increases the likelihood of social unrest as we
might expect.
In Table 6, we add GDP and GDP per capita to the specification. Inclusion of these
variables leads the coefficient on vit to be slightly smaller in magnitude, even though
GDP and GDP per capita have no predictive power themselves. This is not surprising
since both variables are highly correlated with the time-invariant fixed effects that are
present in these specifications. None of the variables have explanatory power for peaceful
demonstrations (column 8), possibly because this type of protest is more associated with
developed countries where BOP crises accompanied by SAPs are a much rarer occurrence
in our dataset.
5. Discussion
The estimates obtained from (2.3) are consistent with the underlying causal channel
proposed by SZ. We now discuss whether these findings might also be consistent with
other salient alternative hypotheses. Of particular importance is that we have controlled
for variables that are thought to drive unrest. For example, liberalization by itself may
lead to unrest, so we have included Oit in the regressions to control for this fact. Similarly,
reductions in government employment may lead to unrest, so we have included Bit by itself
in all regressions. As observed in numerous studies that examine the effect of SAPs, the
introduction of these conditionalities may be driven by unobserved social unrest, so we
control for this by including BOPit in our regressions. Similarly, per-capita GDP can be
seen as a broad outcome variable that reflects institutions broadly defined (Lipset 1960,
Hall and Jones 1999, Dollar and Kraay 2003, Easterly and Levine 2003, Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Salines and Shleifer 2004), and we have controlled for per-capita GDP in the
regressions.
Country-specific fixed effects account for arbitrary persistent idiosyncratic effects
on the incidence of social unrest. Since one might believe the observed correlation be-
tween vulnerability to revolution and unrest to be driven by intertemporal changes in the
propensity of social unrest, we have included year effects in all regressions. Additionally,
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there are in principle many complementary effects on social unrest driven by interactions
among the components of vit, such as the possibility that natural resource intensive coun-
tries that receive SAPs are more unrest-prone relative to others. To account for these
types of influences we have included the full set of interaction permutations between the
components of vit and {Oit, Bit, Ci, BOPit}.
Our having controlled for these factors implies that an alternative theory (i.e. an
omitted variable simultaneously positively correlated with vit and social unrest) would
need to simultaneously influence openness, comparative advantage, government spend-
ing on wages and salaries, and the offering of an SAP to the country concerned while
at the same time not being captured by persistent country-specific or time-specific fac-
tors. At the same time, without a persuasive structural model or instruments for all of
{Oit, Bit, Ci, BOPit}, one cannot rule out the possibility that arbitrary omitted variables
do not drive the observed correlation between vit and unrest. Nevertheless, we believe
that by controlling for these extraneous factors, and thus eliminating them as viable can-
didates to explain the estimates we obtained, we have increased the probability that the
result is driven by the main channel on which we have been focusing.
6. Conclusions
This paper has proposed a way of understanding the link between the imposition of SAPs
in response to BOP crises and the occurrence of social unrest. In response to the greater
inequality brought about by deeper trade integration, if a country has a comparative
advantage in primary products, the rest of society has an incentive to mount a revolution
whereby it expropriates the elite’s assets. In the absence of an SAP, the elite would face
no constraints in making transfers to the rest of society in order to restore the status
quo. But under the constraints imposed by the SAP, it is not immediately able to do
this. Consequently, social unrest breaks out as individuals signal to one another that they
would be prepared to mount a revolution. If the elite did nothing the social unrest would
escalate to the point where it would culminate in a revolution. But generally speaking,
before that point is reached the elite acquiesce and break the conditionality of the SAP,
making the transfers required to restore the status quo.
13
Our empirical approach has been to show that there is a positive correlation between
a country’s vulnerability to revolution and the actual incidence of social unrest using a va-
riety of measures. To check the robustness of these correlations, they were conditioned on
variables capturing salient alternative hypotheses. Our results provide empirical support
for the framework we have laid out. Moreover, they suggest that accounting for institu-
tions through which the elite make transfers to the rest of society in order to restore the
status quo, such as the government civil service, is potentially important for understand-
ing the effectiveness of IMF conditionality at inducing policy compliance. Prior accounts
of such failure to comply had been attributed to ‘lack of commitment by those responsi-
ble for implementing the programs’. The present framework goes further in providing a
concrete set of circumstances under which such lack of commitment would be rational. In
future work it would be useful to test comprehensively for the causality of ‘vulnerability
to revolution’ for the outbreak of social conflict, either by constructing and estimating a
structural model of social conflict in this context, or by obtaining instruments for all four
components of the vulnerability measure.
A particular concern, both in academic and policy circles, has been why some coun-
tries have been provided SAP support for an extended period without any apparent
improvement in their macroeconomic situation. As an illustration of this, Easterly (2005)
shows in Table 1 of his paper that the average outcome across a range of macroeconomic
indicators for the top twenty recipients of SAP support over the period 1980-99 was the
same as those for a broad sample of developing countries. His claim is that if SAPs
are intended to promote growth, then we should expect to see better performance from
countries with SAPs. A second concern is that these countries were supported by SAPs
for such a long time without any discernible improvement in performance. The present
paper provides a way of understanding this situation. For countries with a comparative
advantage in primary products, deeper trade integration (which is mandated under an
SAP) may actually cause a country to have to exit from the program due to the social
unrest that it provokes, presumably without any resolution to the underlying problems.
Repeated attempts to address current account imbalances in this way will repeatedly be
met by the same outcome. Until this set of interactions is taken full account of in IMF
policy initiatives, further progress on this issue is unlikely to be made.
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Table 1. List of Countries
Albania Egypt Lesotho Portugal
Australia El Salvador Liberia Romania
Austria Estonia Lithuania Rwanda
Barbados Finland Luxembourg Senegal
Belarus France Madagascar Seychelles
Belgium Gabon Malaysia Singapore
Benin Georgia Mali Slovenia
Bhutan Greece Malta Spain
Bolivia Guinea Mauritius Sri Lanka
Brazil Haiti Mexico Sweden
Bulgaria Honduras Moldova Switzerland
Burundi Hungary Mongolia Tajikistan
Cameroon Iceland Morocco Tanzania
Chad India Netherlands Thailand
Chile Indonesia Nicaragua Togo
Colombia Ireland Niger Tunisia
Costa Rica Italy Norway Turkey
Croatia Jamaica Pakistan Ukraine
Cyprus Kazakhstan Paraguay Uruguay
Denmark Latvia Peru Vanuatu
Djibouti Lebanon Poland Zambia
Dominica Zimbabwe
Notes: This table provides a list of in-sample countries for
which there exists unrest data. The unbalanced panel
spans the years 1972-2008.
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Table 2. Measures of Social Unrest
BOPit = 0 BOPit = 1
Mean S.D. Mean S.D
Assassinations 0.167 0.373 0.243 0.430
Strikes 0.171 0.376 0.261 0.440
Armed activity 0.163 0.370 0.293 0.456
Threatened regimes 0.198 0.399 0.254 0.436
Opposition elimination 0.090 0.287 0.161 0.368
Violent demonstrations 0.199 0.399 0.336 0.473
Revolution (pos. attempted) 0.132 0.338 0.318 0.466
Peaceful demonstrations 0.271 0.444 0.376 0.485
N 1257 279
This table presents summary statistics for conflict indicators defied
at the country-year level. Assassinations takes a value of unity for
country i in year t if there is a politically motivated murder or at-
tempted murder of a high government official or politician. The
remaining variables are defined analogously. General Strikes takes
a value of unity if there is a strike of 1,000 or more industrial or ser-
vice workers. Guerrilla Warfare takes a value of unity if there is any
armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of
the present regime. Major takes a value of unity if there is any
rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of
the present regime. Purges takes a value of unity if there is any
systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposi-
tion within the ranks of the regime or the opposition. Riots takes
a value of unity if the country experiences a violent demonstra-
tion or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical
force, Revolutions takes a value of unity if there is any illegal or
forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such
a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebelion whose
aim is independence from the central government. Anti-government
demonstrations takes a value of unity if there is any peaceful public
gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of display-
ing or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority.
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Table 3: Social Unrest and IMF SAPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BOPit 0.073* 0.089*** 0.133 0.056** 0.071** 0.144*** 0.192*** 0.108***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.068) (0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.017)
Constant 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.161*** 0.199*** 0.091*** 0.193*** 0.127*** 0.269***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.034) (0.023) (0.010) (0.025) (0.022) (0.029)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nation effects No No No No No No No No
Interaction vector No No No No No No No No
Observations 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493
The dependent value takes a value of one for country i in year t if there is a politically motivated murder or
attempted murder of a high government official or politician (column (1)), if there is a strike of 1,000 or more
industrial or service workers (column (2)), if there is any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime (column (3)), if
there is any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime (column (4)), if
there is any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or
the opposition (column (5)), if the country experiences a violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens
involving the use of physical force (column (6)), if there is any illegal or forced change in the top government elite,
any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebelion whose aim is independence from
the central government (column (7)), and if there is any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the
primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority (column (8)). All
equations include year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the region level are in parentheses below the
estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 4: Social Unrest and Vulnerability to Revolution
Baseline Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vit 0.008 -0.109** 0.042*** -0.008 -0.014 -0.097** -0.033 -0.128***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.035) (0.036) (0.023)
BOPit 0.075 0.016 0.165** 0.053 0.063* 0.083* 0.171*** 0.023
(0.040) (0.029) (0.063) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.039)
Constant 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.163*** 0.199*** 0.090*** 0.192*** 0.127*** 0.268***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.033) (0.024) (0.010) (0.026) (0.022) (0.030)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nation effects No No No No No No No No
Interaction vector No No No No No No No No
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459
This table presents estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable takes a value of one for country i in year t
if there is a politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician (column
(1)), if there is a strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers (column (2)), if there is any armed activity,
sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of
the present regime (column (3)), if there is any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of
the present regime (column (4)), if there is any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition (column (5)), if the country experiences a violent demonstration
or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (column (6)), if there is any illegal or forced
change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebelion
whose aim is independence from the central government (column (7)), and if there is any peaceful public gathering
of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or
authority (column (8)). All equations include year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the region level
are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels.
Table 5. Social Unrest and Vulnerability to Revolution
Adding Country Effects and Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vit 0.365*** 0.279*** 0.333*** 0.120* 0.232*** 0.221*** 0.298*** 0.026
(0.032) (0.013) (0.009) (0.059) (0.010) (0.043) (0.030) (0.108)
BOPit 0.520** 0.271 0.993* -0.034 -0.095 0.302 0.724*** 0.278
(0.131) (0.334) (0.463) (0.538) (0.348) (0.336) (0.122) (0.473)
Cit 0.266 0.056 0.221 -0.278 0.158 -0.042 0.120 0.476
(0.224) (0.393) (0.337) (0.243) (0.298) (0.313) (0.272) (0.449)
Bit 0.082 0.008 -0.008 -0.043 0.023 -0.026 0.089** 0.092
(0.044) (0.064) (0.043) (0.041) (0.049) (0.064) (0.029) (0.080)
Oit 0.227 0.047 -0.354 -0.570 -0.092 -0.268 0.138 0.364
(0.250) (0.411) (0.251) (0.394) (0.428) (0.417) (0.267) (0.557)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nation effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction vector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459
Number of id 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
The dependent value takes a value of one for country i in year t if there is a politically motivated murder or
attempted murder of a high government official or politician (column (1)), if there is a strike of 1,000 or more
industrial or service workers (column (2)), if there is any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime (column (3)), if
there is any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime (column (4)),
if there is any systematic elimination within the ranks of the regime or the opposition (column (5)), if the country
experiences a violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving force force (column (6)), if there
is any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or
unsuccessful armed rebelion whose aim is independence from the central government (column (7)), and if there is
any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people opposing the government (column (8)). All equations include
year and country-specific fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the region level are in parentheses below
the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 6. Social Unrest and Vulnerability to Revolution
Adding Country Effects, Control Variables, GDP and GDP Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vit 0.316*** 0.212*** 0.265*** 0.110* 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.203*** -0.049
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.051) (0.056) (0.032) (0.045) (0.075)
BOPit 0.700*** 0.229 1.235* 0.118 0.166 0.513* 0.912** 0.452
(0.115) (0.289) (0.593) (0.405) (0.230) (0.211) (0.261) (0.436)
Cit 0.328 0.028 0.323 -0.272 0.292 0.102 0.098 0.511
(0.191) (0.382) (0.305) (0.145) (0.255) (0.294) (0.307) (0.381)
Bit 0.055 -0.063 -0.032 -0.122** 0.022 0.009 -0.009 0.084
(0.124) (0.102) (0.063) (0.044) (0.120) (0.093) (0.118) (0.082)
Oit 0.228 -0.017 -0.115 -0.664*** 0.138 0.124 -0.109 0.370
(0.262) (0.432) (0.219) (0.140) (0.318) (0.379) (0.217) (0.386)
GDPit -0.034 -0.051 -0.105 0.083 0.034 0.006 0.003 -0.072
(0.108) (0.084) (0.078) (0.045) (0.132) (0.089) (0.108) (0.050)
GDPit/Nit 0.007 0.032 0.172 -0.075 0.057 0.147 -0.085 0.027
(0.076) (0.029) (0.098) (0.072) (0.048) (0.086) (0.045) (0.106)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nation effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction vector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459
Number of id 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
The dependent value takes a value of one for country i in year t if there is a politically motivated murder or
attempted murder of a high government official or politician (column (1)), if there is a strike of 1,000 or more
industrial or service workers (column (2)), if there is any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime (column (3)), if
there is any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime (column (4)),
if there is any systematic elimination within the ranks of the regime or the opposition (column (5)), if the country
experiences a violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving force force (column (6)), if there
is any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or
unsuccessful armed rebelion whose aim is independence from the central government (column (7)), and if there is
any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people opposing the government (column (8)). All equations include
year and country-specific fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the region level are in parentheses below
the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
